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A Call For Reform
Melisa D. Evangelos*
[In a] case involving complex accounting [the] judge indi-
cated that as a woman attorney, I knew or understood less
about numbers. [The judge] also addressed me as "Young
lady" in front of the jury. I won, but some jurors indicated
it affected the amount I won.'
-Member of the Trial Practice Section of the
Washington State Bar Association
Incidents like the one noted above prompted the Washing-
ton Supreme Court to establish two task forces to study gender
and racial bias in the judicial system.2 More than thirty states,
and the federal government, have established similar groups,
and many have reported their findings.3 The reports, including
* B.A. 1985, Wellesley College; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Puget Sound
School of Law.
1. WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS,
FINAL REPORT OF THE WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE IN
THE COURTS 119 (1989) [hereinafter GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT].
2. The 1987 Washington State Legislature mandated that measures be taken to
prevent minority and gender bias in Washington courts. Act of June 12, 1987, ch. 7,
§ 110(3)(a)-(c), 1987 Wash. Laws 1st Ext. Sess. 2673. Acting on this mandate, the
Washington State Supreme Court established the State Task Force on Gender and
Justice and the State Task Force on Minority and Justice in the Courts.
3. See CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN
THE COURTS, ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE COURTS (Draft
Report 1990); FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL
REPORT (1990); MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE, GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS
(1989); COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF
THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT (1989); MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON
GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, 1989 FINAL REPORT (1989); NEVADA SUPREME
COURT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, JUSTICE FOR WOMEN (1989); NEw JERSEY SUPREME
COURT TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, SECOND REPORT (1986); NEw JERSEY
SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, THE FIRST YEAR REPORT
(1984); NEw YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, REPORT (1986-87); RHODE
ISLAND COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT (1987); WASHINGTON
MINORITY AND JUSTICE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (1990) [hereinafter MINORITY AND
JUSTICE REPORT].
The Ninth Circuit also established a gender bias study committee to study gender
bias in the federal courts, and its findings were presented at the Ninth Circuit Annual
Conference in mid-1992. Christene E. Sherry, Ninth Circuit Undertakes Pioneering
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the Washington reports, universally conclude that gender and
racial bias is pervasive in the legal profession, that bias deters
and sometimes prohibits the effective delivery of justice, and
that affirmative steps are needed to address and eliminate the
effects of gender and racial bias.4
Because of the documented threat that racial and gender
bias pose to the effective administration of justice in Washing-
ton, this Comment advocates amending the Washington Rules
of Professional Conduct to explicitly make intentional gender
and racial bias an act of attorney misconduct and to discipline
any attorney who engages in such behavior.5 Section I of this
Comment identifies and describes instances of attorney behav-
ior that result in gender and racial bias and explains the
impact of such bias on attorneys, clients, and the judicial sys-
tem. Section II explores similar anti-bias rules proposed or in
place in other states. Section III introduces the rule advocated
in this Comment, compares this proposal to the approaches
taken by other states, and explains the operation of the rule.
Section IV examines the constitutionality of the proposed rule
Study as Federal Courts Aim at Thwarting Gender Bias, LITIGATION NEWS, Dec. 1991,
at 11.
4. Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHics 1, 1 (1990).
5. Members of Washington Women Lawyers and the Washington State Bar
Association Committee on Opportunities for Minorities in the Legal Profession drafted
the proposed rule advocated in this Comment. The proposed rule adds the following
Section (g) to Washington RPC 8.4 governing misconduct:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in harassment or invidious
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national
origin, disability, sexual orientation or marital status in connection with a
lawyer's professional activities.
See infra part III.
The Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) adopted this proposed rule in
principle and sent the rule to the Rules of Professional Conduct Committee for fur-
ther consideration. After lengthy debate, the Rules Committee recommended passage
of the proposed rule as modified by the Committee. The revised rule read as follows:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... commit a discriminatory act
prohibited by law or harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, reli-
gion, color, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, or marital status,
where the act of discrimination or harassment is committed in connection
with the lawyer's professional activities.
The modified rule eliminated reference to the term "invidious" and thus significantly
limited the scope of the proposed rule's application to harassment and unlawful dis-
crimination.
On March 28, 1992, the WSBA Board of Governors sent the modified proposed
rule (WSBA proposal) to the Washington State Supreme Court with an overwhelming
"do pass" recommendation. The court will act on the proposed rule in the spring of
1993.
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of professional conduct (RPC), concluding that the rule would
withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Finally, Section V
argues that the proposed RPC would be an effective and neces-
sary tool in combating racial and gender bias in the Washing-
ton court system and concludes that the Washington State
Supreme Court should adopt the proposed amendment to the
Washington Rules of Professional Conduct.
I. GENDER AND RACIAL BIAS IMPAIR THE FAIR AND
EFFEcTIvE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The Gender and Justice and Minority Task Forces under-
took studies to identify bias in Washington court proceedings,
and to explore its effect on the fairness and effectiveness of the
judicial system. Part A briefly explains the use of the word
"bias" in the two Task Force reports and in this Comment.
Part B then explores the bias found in the Washington court
system and demonstrates that the fair and effective adminis-
tration of justice is threatened when such bias is used as a tac-
tical device.6
A. What Is Bias?
Bias is an inclination, bent, predisposition, or preconceived
opinion.7 Bias includes "any action or attitude that interferes
with impartial judgment."' The Gender and Justice Report
explains that "gender bias ... is evident in society's perception
of the value of women's and men's work, and the myths and
misconceptions about the social and economic realities of
women's and men's lives."9 The Minority and Justice Report
characterizes minority bias, including racial, ethnic, cultural
and linguistic bias as a conscious or unconscious act or decision,
6. This Comment advocates amending the Washington Rules of Professional
Conduct in order to reduce the amount of gender and minority bias in the judicial
system. However, in an effort to limit the scope of this section, and because the effects
of gender bias by attorneys and on attorneys is better documented, this section focuses
primarily on the effect of gender bias in Washington courts. In addition, although
certain types of harassing and discriminatory behavior are uniquely directed against
gender or minority groups, many forms of such behavior can be employed against any
of the groups that the rule protects. Therefore, for the purpose of analysis, the terms
"gender" and "race" are used in this Comment to represent all of the characteristics
that traditionally form the basis for impermissible discrimination. See Ellen E. Lange,
Note, Racist Speech on Campus: A Title VII Solution to a First Amendment Problem,
64 S. CAL. L. REv. 105, 105 n.2,(1990).
7. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (6th ed. 1990).
8. GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at xiii.
9. Id.
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which may or may not result in disparate treatment.10
B. How Does Bias Affect the Judicial System?
The Washington Task Forces studied the effect of gender
and racial bias on the delivery of justice in the Washington
Court system and found that lawyers commonly pander to
such bias in judges and juries in litigation and negotiation tac-
tics." Such tactics most severely impair the judicial system
when they alter case outcomes. Even when the ultimate out-
comes of cases are not affected, however, these tactics impair
the integrity of the legal profession, cause participants to lose
faith in the judicial process, and prevent women and minority
lawyers from effectively carrying out their duties.
The Gender and Justice Task Force found that a substan-
tial number of lawyers and judges believe that gender bias
exists in the Washington courts.12 More significantly, over one
third of the lawyers who participated in a task force survey
believed that gender bias occasionally affected case outcome.13
Gender-biased behavior by attorneys falls into three categories:
disrespectful behavior, sexual trial tactics, and sexual
advances.
1. Disrespectful Behavior
The most common form of gender-biased behavior by
attorneys is disrespectful behavior, including inappropriate use
of first names, demeaning remarks, familiar terms, comments
about personal appearance, and even facial expressions.14 This
10. MINORITY AND JUSTICE TASK REPORT, supra note 3, at xx, 3.
11. See GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 125-33.
12. Seventy-four percent of the lawyers and 54 percent of the judges participating
in a Task Force survey "believe[d that] gender-based discrimination exists to some
degree in the Washington Courts." Id. at 112.
13. Id. at 130.
14. The GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT summarized the following disrespectful
behavior patterns reported in a survey of Washington judges and attorneys:
* Opposing counsel (45 percent) and court personnel (37 percent) addressed
female lawyers by first name when lawyers of the opposite gender were
addressed by surname;
* Judges (26 percent) and opposing counsel (38 percent) addressed female
lawyers by familiar terms (e.g., "dear," "young lady," "girls");
e Judges (26 percent) and lawyers (49 percent) complimented female lawyers
on their appearance;
9 Opposing counsel (39 percent) and court personnel (38 percent) asked
female attorneys if they were lawyers when lawyers of the opposite gender
were not asked;
[Vol. 16:741
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subtle form of bias can have a dramatic effect on courtroom
atmosphere. When opposing counsel, judges, or court person-
nel address a female lawyer by her first name, while male law-
yers are addressed by surnames, the professional status of the
female attorney is immediately reduced. The impact is even
greater when female attorneys are addressed by familiar
names such as "dear" or "young lady."' 5 Addressing female
attorneys in this manner suggests to a jury that female lawyers
are held in lower esteem, that they are less professional, and
that they are not taken seriously. As a consequence of this
gender-biased behavior, women attorneys become less effective
advocates.
The excerpt noted at the beginning of this Comment illus-
trates how bias affects the credibility of a litigator and can
affect the outcome of a case. The judge reduced the credibility
of the female attorney by communicating to the jury the stere-
otyped idea that this attorney, like all women, has inferior
mathematical abilities, and he further diminished her stature
by addressing her as "young lady."
Demeaning remarks, as well as racial and sexist jokes,
have a significant impact on the judicial system.'6 Such
remarks reflect a systemic sexist and racist tolerance. Gender-
or race-biased behavior takes the judge or jury's mind off of
the merits of a case and onto the immutable characteristics of a
litigant or witness. Even compliments about personal appear-
ance can have the effect of drawing emphasis toward appear-
ance and away from the professional role of a female
* Lawyers (43 percent) addressed female litigants and witnesses by first name
when those of the opposite gender were addressed by surnames;
* Female litigants and witnesses were addressed in familiar terms by judges
(25 percent) and lawyers (31 percent);
0 Female litigants were regarded as less credible because of their gender by
judges of the opposite gender (29 percent) and lawyers of the opposite gender
(36 percent);
0 Women judges were addressed by first name by other judges (42 percent)
and by lawyers (35 percent);
* Affidavits of prejudice were used to disqualify a woman judge primarily
because of her gender (29 percent);
* Remarks or jokes demeaning to women were made either in court or in
chambers by judges (38 percent) and lawyers (58 percent).
Id.
15. 1& at 119.
16. In Washington, 71 percent of female attorneys and 46 percent of male
attorneys, responding to the Task Force survey, reported that they were aware of
counsel making sexist jokes and remarks. GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1,
at 163.
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attorney. 17 When jurors observe judges or attorneys treating
other attorneys or witnesses with disrespect, "the litigants
stand less of a chance of prevailing on the merits of a case."'"
2. Sexual Trial Tactics
Ours is an adversarial system of justice. With this system
comes a "sporting theory of justice"-a belief that a lawyer
must do whatever it takes to fully and aggressively represent
his or her client.'9 Thus, some lawyers justify sexual trial tac-
tics as an appropriate technique of client advocacy. Kandis
Koustenis identifies sexual trial tactics as "deliberate efforts by
opposing counsel to undermine women litigators on the basis
of their gender."'2 Demeaning remarks, comments suggesting
stereotyped behavior, even compliments become sexual trial
tactics when they are used by attorneys to distract, intimidate,
17. Id. at 129.
In the GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, a member of the Washington Association of
Prosecuting Attorneys described the following instance in which a purported
compliment made about a woman attorney was, in fact, a demeaning sexual trial tactic:
In voir dire, a male attorney asked a juror if the decision would be based on/
affected by the fact that [the opposing counsel] was "young and prettier."
This happened repeatedly. When [the woman attorney] objected [repeatedly],
the judge compounded the problem first by smiling and saying that [she] was
younger and prettier, then by laughing and finally frowning at [the] objection
Id. at 132.
18. Id. at 123.
19. See Kandis Koustenis, Note, Sexual Trial Tactics: The Ability of the Model
Code and Model Rules to Discipline Discriminatory Coniflicts Between Adversaries, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 153, 157-59 (1990). To illustrate the attitude of some attorneys
toward sexual trial tactics, Koustenis described a case in which a male attorney
defended his gender discriminatory tactics as "guerrilla warfare." Ironically, the case
involved a claim that the FBI had discriminated against Hispanic agents. Id. at 155.
20. Id. at 153 (attributing the definition of "sexual trial tactics" to Jill Wine-Banks
of the Chicago firm of Jenner & Block).
In her Note, Koustenis provides an example of sexual trial tactics in which a
litigator described the following scene from a deposition with six male opposing
attorneys:
They treated me very courteously while they were doing the questioning. But
when I asked my first question, one attorney lurched across the table and
shouted, "Objection!" I responded, "I would like the record to reflect counsel
just jumped across the table and screamed his objection." He was subdued
after that, but the other five took up the tactic. It continued for eight hours
on every question, and was obviously contrived to intimidate me.
Id. at 156 (quoting Sherrill Kushner & Valerie Lezin, Bias in the Courtroom, 14 BAR-
RISTER 9, 11 (1987)).
It is important to note that the use of degrading behavior as a "sexual trial tactic"
may be used against any individual perceived by the lawyer to be less powerful,
regardless of gender. See GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 117.
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or frustrate opposing counsel, or to play to a judge or jury's
inherent biases.
The sexual trial tactics that can be employed against attor-
neys, litigants, and witnesses generally fall into two categories:
tactics designed to intimidate and tactics designed to reduce
the credibility of those attorneys, litigants, and witnesses.
Intimidation tactics often include overly aggressive or abusive
behavior 2' by male attorneys, but can even include compli-
ments by male attorneys to younger female attorneys.22 These
seemingly harmless comments directed at an "attorney's physi-
cal appearance . . . [suggest] that looks matter more than
brains or competence. Attention is diverted from counsel's
professional expertise and shifted instead to her looks.123
Tactics designed to reduce credibility often include
attempts to reinforce stereotypes that a woman is less believa-
ble because the subject matter is beyond the stereotypical
knowledge of a woman or that her emotions have clouded her
perception.24 The excerpt noted at the beginning of this Com-
ment is an example of precisely this type of stereotyping:
women are not mathematically inclined.
Sexual stereotyping can also defeat attempts by a woman
to defend herself against sexist or derogatory remarks. The
Gender and Justice Report describes an incident where a
woman attorney waiting for a trial assignment was called a
"feisty young thing" by the opposing counsel.25 Opposing coun-
sel then requested that they not be assigned to a woman judge
at trial because she and the woman attorney would "gang up
on him."'26 When the female attorney complained about the
incident, the assigning judge dismissed the incident, treating it
as a joke.' The opposing counsel characterized the female
attorney as a "humorless feminist. '
21. Aggressive or abusive behavior is described here as a sexual trial tactic. It
should be noted, however, that aggressive or abusive behavior is perceived by some
attorneys to be a legitimate tactic in any proceeding against any opposing counsel. In
In re Vincenti, discussed infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text, Vincenti was
disciplined for abusive behavior directed toward a male opposing counsel and a female
law clerk. In re Vincenti, 554 A.2d 470, 473 (N.J. 1988).
22. GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 120.
23. Id,
24. Id. at 125.
25. Id at 119.
26. Id.
27. GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 119.
28. Id.
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Male participants in the legal system are also victimized by
stereotyping. The Gender and Justice Task Force notes
instances "where men were accorded less credibility vis-a-vis
parenting of young children.' ' 9
Another notable use of stereotyping affecting both men
and women is the use of affidavits of prejudice to disqualify
both male and female judges based solely on gender. The Gen-
der and Justice Report indicates that nearly half of the judges
that responded to the Task Force survey "believed [that] affi-
davits of prejudice had been used to disqualify a woman judge
because of her gender,"' and almost a quarter of the respond-
ing judges "believed [that] affidavits of prejudice had been used
against male judges because of gender."'"
The problem with this theory of advocacy is that discrimi-
natory trial tactics are typically unrelated to the merits of the
case and do not further the truth-seeking process. Such tactics
can be analogized to irrelevant testimony-unequivocally inad-
missible at trial.3 2 "Just as physical combat in the 11th century
did not lead to the truth but to the better warrior, [sexual trial]
tactics today do not help to discover the truth but merely the
wilier litigator."'3
Behavior that is intentionally demeaning and discrimina-
tory has a further effect: it erodes the participants' "confi-
dence in the integrity and the impartiality of the judicial
process."'  Concern for preserving the fairness in judicial pro-
ceedings precipitated the passage of a professional conduct rule
barring the use of such tactics in New Jersey.35 In comments
following a recently adopted anti-discrimination rule of profes-
sional conduct,' the court cited to In re Vincenti,3 7 an attor-
ney disciplinary case, in which the New Jersey State Supreme
Court sanctioned an attorney for violations of the New Jersey
Rules of Professional Conduct.3 8 During the course of an ear-
lier trial Vincenti made numerous threatening, offensive, and
29. Id at 125.
30. Id at 128.
31. ld.
32. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (1991).
33. Koustenis, supra note 19, at 158.
34. GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 123.
35. NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(g) (1992). See
discussion infra part II.A.
36. NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1992).
37. 554 A.2d 470 (N.J. 1989).
38. NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.2 and 8.4(d) (1992).
[Vol. 16:741
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obscene remarks and gestures to the opposing counsel and
directed abusive language at the judge's law clerk.39
The court found that by his conduct Vincenti was guilty of
violating the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice.4° The Vincenti court was particularly sensitive to the
effect of offensive conduct on the judicial system as a whole,
commenting that such conduct is intolerable "because it has an
effect that tends to undermine the proper administration of
justice."'" The court further noted that "undue and extrane-
ous oppression and harassment of participants involved in liti-
gation can impair their effectiveness, not only as advocates for
their clients, but also as officers of the court."'
Additionally, the court found Vincenti's remarks contain-
ing invidious racial connotations to be particularly intolerable.
The court stressed that "[i]n the context of either the practice
of law or the administration of justice, prejudice both to the
standing of this profession and the administration of justice
will be virtually conclusive if intimidation, abuse, harassment,
or threats focus or dwell on invidious discriminatory
distinctions. ' 43
Unequal access to the arsenal of sexual and racial tactics
poses a further problem to this theory of advocacy. Because
lawyers engaging in sexual or racial trial tactics are often play-
ing to a judge or jury's deeply rooted biases, opposing counsel,
or in some instances witnesses or litigants, cannot simply
employ a reverse strategy to counter the effect of the bias.
Finally, bullying and insults should not be part of a law-
yer's trial tactics whether or not such conduct can be deployed
equally by all parties. Such behavior draws attention away
from the merits of the case and onto the sideshow performed
39. Vincenti, 554 A.2d at 471.
40. Id. at 473.
41. Id
42. Id at 473-74.
43. Id. at 474. See also Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 657 P.2d
372 (Cal. 1983) (facially blatant ethnic slurs by judges constituted "unjudicial conduct"
and "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice"); In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99
(Cal. 1982) (repeated use by judge of racial and ethnic epithets warrants public
censure, even if judge otherwise performed judicial duties fairly and equitably and free
from actual bias); In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394 (Minn. 1987) (attorney's use of racial
slur to opposing counsel violates the MINNESOTA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPoNSIRLrY).
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by overly aggressive attorneys at the expense of the standing
of the profession and the rights of the litigants.
3. Verbal and Physical Sexual Advances
"Sexual harassment is a significant obstacle to a woman's
advancement in the legal profession,"" and it further demeans
the integrity of the profession.45 Like disrespectful behavior
and sexual and racial trial tactics, physical and verbal harass-
ment can prevent attorneys from effectively representing their
clients. An attorney is often unable to adequately retaliate
because her client's interests are at stake, or because she fears
she will jeopardize her career.4 As one commentator explains,
a woman attorney who has been sexually harassed at her place
of employment often chooses "to resign or suffer silently due
to the fear of being black-balled or black-listed from other rep-
utable law firms."47 Outside the employment setting, a woman
attorney may have similar fears that reporting incidents of sex-
ual harassment by opposing counsel, judges, or other court per-
sonnel may jeopardize her career. Harassment laws do not
provide adequate redress for instances of sexual harassment
because existing laws do not govern many of the settings in
which harassment is likely to occur.48
Verbal and physical sexual advances toward female law-
yers were reported by both attorneys and judges in the Gender
and Justice Report.49 One respondent described an incident in
which a judge made a verbal sexual advance on an attorney"and when ignored proceeded to be very hard on [that attor-
ney's client], assess[ing] an enormous award against [that] cli-
44. Jody Meier, Note, Sexual Harassment in Law Firms: Should Attorneys be
Disciplined Under the Lawyer Codes?, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 169, 169 (1990).
45. See, e.g., id
46. The Author recognizes that women could be sexual harassers as well as men.
However, she has not discovered any reported incidents of this behavior by female
lawyers.
47. Meier, supra note 44, at 170 (citing Nina Burleigh & Stephanie B. Goldberg,
Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harassment in Law Firms, 75 A.B.A. J. 46, 51 (1989)).
48. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 only protects individuals from
harassment in the workplace. It does not cover harassment of a female attorney by.a
male opposing counsel, or harassment of a litigant, witness, or even a client. See
discussion infra parts III.B. and IV.B.
49. GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 121. Verbal sexual advances
toward female lawyers were reported by 16 percent of attorneys and by 4 percent of
judges. Id. Physical sexual advances toward female attorneys by male attorneys were
reported by 5 percent of attorneys and two percent of judges. Id.
[Vol. 16:741
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ent contrary to law."'  The survey respondent then noted that
"[t]he Supreme Court reversed and granted a directed verdict
to [the client].""1
Florida's Gender Bias Task Force reported several inci-
dents of verbal and physical harassment occurring in law
firms. "The Florida Task Force report describes incidents
where one female associate was told that her employment
depended upon her attractiveness, where another was told to
sit on a partner's lap during a meeting, and.., where another
was told by a partner that he chose not to settle a case so that
they could go on a business trip together. "2
In sum, the Washington Task Force reports, and reports
from across the country, indicate that women and minority
attorneys, litigants, and witnesses are routinely subjected to
"inappropriate or demeaning forms of address, argument or
examination.""3 Such behavior impairs an attorney's ability to
do his or her job effectively, impairs a litigant's ability to
receive a fair hearing, and demeans the profession. Addition-
ally, demeaning, harassing, and discriminatory behavior
extracts a high emotional toll on all who fall victim to such
attacks. Every study has found a need for reform in order to
eliminate the impact of bias on the judicial system. The fol-
lowing section describes certain states' attempts to combat the
effect of bias on the judicial system and to curb attorneys' use
of bias as a litigation tool.
II. CURRENT EFFORTS To CURB DISCRIMINATORY AND
HARASSING BEHAVIOR
In response to recommendations by state task forces,
supreme courts in Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, and Vermont have adopted professional conduct rules
that address discriminatory or harassing behavior. Florida and
Michigan are currently considering similar proposals. Addi-
tionally, while the Model Code of Professional Responsibility'M
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct5 do not include
50. 1& (emphasis in original).
51. l
52. Meier, supra note 44, at 170 n.12 (citing Nina Burleigh & Stephanie B.
Goldberg, Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harassment in Law Firms, 75 A.B.A. J. 46, 51
(1989)).
53. Czapanskiy, supra note 4, at 3.
54. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
55. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUr (1983).
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specific provisions governing harassment or discriminatory
behavior, drafters of the Model Judicial CodesS made amend-
ments that make discriminatory behavior by judges sanction-
able. While the spirit and purpose of each of the rules is
generally the same-the reduction of bias in the judicial sys-
tem-each of the rules differ in form57 and scope.'M This sec-
tion sets out the various approaches taken by the states and by
the Model Judicial Code.
A. Attorney Conduct Rules
The New Jersey Rule adds the following section to Rule
8.4 governing misconduct:
(g) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage, in a
professional capacity, in conduct involving discrimination
(except employment discrimination unless resulting in a
final agency or judicial determination) because of race, color,
religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital
status, socioeconomic status, or handicap, where the conduct
is intended or likely to cause harm.5 9
Like Washington, the New Jersey professional conduct
rules for attorneys fairly track the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. The New Jersey rule is intended to cover attorneys'
professional activities, including courtroom behavior, treat-
ment of other attorneys, their staffs, and court personnel. It
covers conduct in a lawyer's office and activities of professional
organizations.'M The New Jersey rule does not, however, cover
conduct outside of a lawyer's professional activities.
The New Jersey rule explicitly excludes employment dis-
crimination in hiring, firing, or promotion, unless that behavior
has resulted in formal agency or judicial determination of dis-
criminatory behavior.6 ' In comments following the New
Jersey rule, the New Jersey State Supreme Court stated that
56. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
57. "Form" describes the manner in which a state has chosen to implement the
conduct rule. For example, states may either append or modify existing rules of
professional conduct or add entirely new provisions to their rules. The Washington
proposal adds a new section to Rule 8.4 governing misconduct.
58. "Scope" refers to the type and severity of behavior regulated by a particular
rule.
59. NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(g) (1992).
60. Susan Riss, Nation's Toughest Bias Rules Issued; Lawyers' Discrimination
Against Gays, the Poor, Barred, N.J.L.J., Aug. 9, 1990, at 27.
61. NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(g) & cmt. (1992).
[Vol. 16:741
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employment discrimination is better handled by existing agen-
cies or the courts.6 2
Interestingly, Vermont has taken the opposite approach.
While the Vermont professional conduct rules do not contain
provisions governing discriminatory behavior in the courtroom
and other legal settings, the rules explicitly proscribe discrimi-
nation "in hiring, promoting, or otherwise determining the
conditions of employment of that individual.""
New York professional conduct rules also explicitly pro-
hibit employment discrimination. The New York rule provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not: . . . Unlawfully discriminate in the
practice of law, including in hiring, promoting or otherwise
determining conditions of employment, on the basis of age,
race, creed, color, national origin, sex, disability, or marital sta-tus .... 64
Similar to the New Jersey rule, drafters of the Minnesota
rule expanded Rule 8.4. The scope of the rule, however, is lim-
ited to acts of harassment. The Minnesota rule provides that it
is "professional misconduct for a lawyer to... harass a person
on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national ori-
gin, disability, sexual preference or marital status in connec-
tion with a lawyer's professional activities."65 The Minnesota
Supreme Court recently adopted a further amendment adding
illegal discrimination to the rules governing attorney miscon-
duct.'S In addition, the court added substantial comments fol-
lowing Rule 8.4 explaining the scope, intent, and purpose of
62. Id Rule 8.4(g) cmt.
63. The Vermont rule provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not ... discriminate against any individual because of his or
her race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, place of birth or age, or
against a qualified handicapped individual, in hiring, promoting, or otherwise
determining the conditions of employment of that individual.
VERMONT CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1991).
64. NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1200.3(a)(6) (1993).
65. MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 8.4(g) (1992).
66. The amendment added the following section to Rule 8.4:
It is professional misconduct for an attorney to . . . commit a discriminatory
act, prohibited by federal, state or local statute or ordinance, that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer. Whether a discriminatory act
reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness as a lawyer shall be determined after
consideration of all the circumstances, including (1) the seriousness of the act,
(2) whether the lawyer knew that it was prohibited by statute or ordinance,
(3) whether it was part of a pattern of prohibited conduct, and (4) whether it
was committed in connection with the lawyer's professional activities.
MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(h) (1992).
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the discrimination and bias rules.6 7 Because the language of
professional conduct rules is often broad, and sometimes
ambiguous enough to allow flexibility in application, such com-
ments are helpful in fleshing out the meaning and the applica-
tion of these rules in particular contexts. Additionally, such
comments often provide insight into the motivation for inclu-
sion of a particular rule.
In a paragraph explaining the impetus for the anti-dis-
crimination amendment in the Minnesota Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, the drafters reflect the position taken in this
Comment:
[The provision proscribing discrimination] reflects the prem-
ise that the concept of human equality lies at the very heart
of our legal system. A lawyer whose behavior demonstrates
hostility toward or indifference to the policy of equal justice
under the law thereby manifests a lack of character
required of members of the legal profession. 8
Like Washington, Minnesota, and New Jersey, the Rhode
Island Rules of Professional Conduct fairly track the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. However, rather than adding a
new provision to Section 8.4, governing professional miscon-
duct, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted language from
an existing provision-conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice69-but also added language identifying "harmful
or discriminatory treatment of litigants, jurors, witnesses, law-
yers, and others based on race, nationality, or sex,"7 as preju-
dicial conduct.
The Michigan State Bar recently proposed what are per-
haps the most radical and far-reaching amendments to attor-
ney conduct rules.71 The proposed Rule 5.7 adds a new section
67. See id. Rule 8.4 cmt.
68. The Bench and Bar of Minnesota, May/June 1991, at 24.
69. RHODE ISLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT RULE 8.4(d) (1992).
70. Id. The Rhode Island rule states as follows: "It is professional misconduct for
a lawyer to ... engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,
including but not limited to harmful or discriminatory treatment of litigants, jurors,
witnesses, lawyers, and others based on race, nationality, or sex."
71. MICHIGAN RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 5.7 (State Bar Proposal
1991). The Michigan State Supreme Court is also considering recommendations from
the State Task Forces on Racial/Ethnic Issues in the Courts and Gender Issues in the
Courts. The Task Force proposal recommends adding the following language to Rule
8.4 of the MIcHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT: "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to . . . engage in sexual harassment or invidious discrimination."
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to the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct headed "Dis-
criminatory Practices," which states the following-
(a) A lawyer shall not engage in invidious discrimination on
the basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual ori-
entation, or ethnic origin, and shall prohibit staff and agents
subject to the lawyer's direction and control from doing so.
(b) A lawyer shall not hold membership in any organization
which the lawyer knows invidiously discriminates on the
basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual orienta-
tion, or ethnic origin.
(c) A lawyer serving as an adjudicative officer shall prohibit
invidious discrimination on the basis of gender, race, reli-
gion, disability, age, sexual orientation, or ethnic origin
against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others on the part of
lawyers in proceedings before the adjudicative officer.72
The Michigan proposal attempts to expand the scope of
coverage of professional conduct rules beyond all existing
rules. The proposed rule not only governs attorney behavior,
but it makes an attorney responsible for the conduct of those
under his or her control. The rule governs both the profes-
sional and the private activities of an attorney, proposing sanc-
tions for conduct that is not necessarily illegal. Comments
included in the state bar proposal make it clear that there need
not be a "formal adjudication that the conduct is illegal or
actionable for there to be grounds for discipline."73
In support of the constitutionality of the provision barring
membership in clubs that discriminate, the Comments con-
clude that "[t]here is no constitutional right to discriminate,"7 4
and suggest that there is a "sufficiently compelling state inter-
est"75 in preventing harassment and discrimination in the legal
profession that can only be accomplished by proscribing such
conduct.76 The Comments further note, however, that organi-
zations associated with particular religions that are "closed to
persons of different religious persuasion" are exempted from
this rule.77
MICHIGAN RuIs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(f) (Task Force Proposal 1991)
(new language in emphasis).
72. Id
73. Id. Rule 5.7 cmt.
74. Id.
75. Id
76. MlCHiGAN RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 5.7 cmt. (State Bar
Proposal 1991).
77. Id.
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B. Judicial Conduct Rules
In August 1990, the American Bar Association adopted
revisions to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct,78 which spe-
cifically "direct judges not to manifest bias or prejudice them-
selves and not to permit those under their direction and
control to do so." 9 Canon 3 of the revised Judicial Code now
includes the following two sections:
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or
prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial
duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice,
including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon
race, sex, religion,. national origin, disability, age, sexual ori-
entation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff,
court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and
control to do so.
(6) A judge shall require* lawyers in proceedings before the
judge to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias
or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status,
against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. This section
3B(6) does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status, or other similar factors, are issues in
the proceeding.s0
Comments following the new model judicial rules echo
many of the same concerns about bias described in this Com-
ment. The drafters explain: "A judge who manifests bias on
any basis in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding
and brings the judiciary into disrepute."8' The drafters further
note that "[j]udicial bias, as perceived by parties or lawyers in
the proceeding, jurors, the media and others, may be mani-
78. The Code of Conduct Subcommittee of the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility drafted the recommendations as part of a total
reexamination of the Judicial Code, which began in 1987. Lynn Hecht Schafran, The
Obligation to Intervene: New Direction From the American Bar Association Code of
Judicial Conduct, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 53, 53 (1990).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 53-54 (citing the MODEL JUDICIAL CODE § 3B(5) (Final Draft 1989)). The
asterisk after "require" indicates that it is defined in the terminology section of the
Judicial Code. Id. at 54 n.5. That section explains that the word "require" is subject to
the rule of reason, and that "[t]he use of the term "require" in the [context of this
rule] means [that] a judge is to exercise reasonable direction and control over the
persons subject to a judge's direction and control." Id.
81. Id. at 54 n.4 (citing the MODEL JUDICIAL CODE § 3B(5) cmts. (Final Draft
1989)).
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fested by nonverbal communication such as facial expression
and body language as well as words.""2
Two proposals to amend the Michigan Code of Judicial
Conduct are currently before the Michigan Supreme Court,
one drafted by the Michigan Task Force on Racial/Ethical
Issues in the Courts and the Task Force on Gender Issues in
the Courts and the other drafted by the Michigan State Bar.
The Task Force proposal adds language to Canon 3(A) of the
Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct and states:
(10) A judge shall not engage in sexual harassment or invid-
ious discrimination and shall prohibit staff, court officials,
and others subject to the judge's direction and control from
doing so. A judge shall prohibit sexual harassment or invidi-
ous discrimination against parties, counsel, or others on the
part of lawyers in proceedings before the judge. s3
The Task Force proposal modifies the Michigan Court Rules
by adding a new provision to Rule 2.003 governing the disquali-
fication of a judge, and a new provision to Rule 9.205 governing
the standards of judicial conduct. The new provision in Rule
2.003 would disqualify a judge from hearing a case in "a pro-
ceeding in which the judge ... (7) has engaged in sexual har-
assment or invidious discrimination .... ." New Rule 9.205
would make a judge who "engages in sexual harassment or
invidious discrimination against parties, counsel, or others"
guilty of misconduct in office.'
The Michigan State Bar proposal first modifies Canon 2(C)
of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, adding the follow-
ing language: "A judge shall not hold membership in any
organization that the judge knows invidiously discriminates on
the basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual orien-
tation, or ethnic origin."'" The State Bar proposal then adds
Section (c) to Canon 3, which states:
A judge shall not engage in invidious discrimination on the
basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual orienta-
tion, or ethnic origin, and shall prohibit staff, court officials,
and others subject to the judge's direction and control from
doing so. A judge shall prohibit invidious discrimination
82. Id.
83. MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A (State Bar Proposal 1991).
84. MICHIGAN COURT RULES Rule 2.003 (State Bar Proposal 1991).
85. Id. Rule 9.205.
86. MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(c) (State Bar Proposal 1991).
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against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others on the part of
lawyers in proceedings before the judge.17
The State Bar proposal adds a section to Rule 9.205 of the
Michigan Court Rules that makes a judge "guilty of miscon-
duct in office if... the judge engages in invidious discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual
orientation, or ethnic origin.""
III. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE WASHINGTON RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
As Section II illustrates, various approaches have been
taken by states in drafting rules designed to eliminate the
effects of bias on state judiciaries. Based on the experiences of
these states, members of Washington Women Lawyers and the
Washington State Bar Association Committee on Opportunities
for Minorities in the Legal Profession drafted an amendment
to the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct.89 This
author advocates the adoption of the original proposed amend-
ment, which adds the following provision to Rule 8.4 governing
misconduct:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in har-
assment or invidious discrimination on the basis of sex, race,
age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual
orientation or marital status in connection with a lawyer's
professional activities.
Part A first compares the rule proposed in this Comment
to the rules adopted by other states and to the WSBA rule
presently under consideration by the Washington Supreme
Court. Part B then explains the operation and application of
the proposed Washington rule, using Title VII and Washington
discrimination laws as models for interpreting the proposed
rule.
A. Comparison of the Proposed Washington RPCs and Rules
from Other States
Like the New Jersey rule, the rule proposed in this section
adds an additional provision to Rule 8.4. Because the rules
serve an educational as well as a disciplinary function, adding a
87. Id. Canon 3(c).
88. MIcHIGAN COURT RuLES Rule 9.205 (State Bar Proposal 1991).
89. See supra note 5.
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separate section-in contrast with Rhode Island's approach
adding definitional language to existing sections of its RPC-
highlights recognition by the Bar and the judiciary of the
importance of such rules.
Unlike the Minnesota rule and the Washington State Bar
Association proposal currently before the Washington State
Supreme Court, the rule advocated here targets both harass-
ment and invidious discrimination. Use of the term "invidious
discrimination" distinguishes instances of legitimate distinction
based on a characteristic from distinction based on an evil
motive. Thus, this term targets discriminatory trial tactics.
Use of the word "invidious" has the same effect as the provi-
sion in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, stating that lan-
guage barring a judge from manifesting bias or prejudice "does
not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeco-
nomic status.., are issues in [a] proceeding."' Consequently,
the use of the word "invidious" appropriately limits the scope
of the rule to the kinds of behavior most harmful to the judi-
cial system. Similarly, the use of the term "unlawful discrimi-
nation," such as the rule currently under consideration in
Washington and Minnesota, would limit the rule to thresholds
established by Title VII and state anti-discrimination laws.
Thus, this language would not protect harassment or discrimi-
nation in settings not currently covered by state and federal
law. Furthermore, it would not protect against harassment or
invidious discrimination based on sexual orientation or marital
status, because these classes are not recognized as protected
under the law.
The New Jersey rule is arguably more expansive than the
Washington proposal because the New Jersey rule covers con-
duct "likely to cause harm,"'" whereas the Washington lan-
guage is limited to intentional acts of discrimination or
harassment.
Unlike the current Michigan proposal, the proposed Wash-
ington language covers only lawyers' professional activities.
The Michigan language may imperinissibly chill an attorney's
associational rights under the First Amendment.92 One way
90. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucT Canon 3B(b) (1990).
91. NEw JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 8.4(g) (1992).
92. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. But see New York State Club
Assoc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Board of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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for Washington to achieve a similar result without running
afoul of the Constitution would be to include aspirational,
rather than mandatory, language in comments explaining the
rule, suggesting that lawyers and judges refrain from partici-
pation in non-legal activities that condone racist and sexist
behavior.
While the rule advocated in this Comment does not
expressly identify employment discrimination or harassment
as grounds for sanctions, lawyers' professional activities clearly
include legal employment. Thus, the proposed rule should be
interpreted to include harassment or invidious discrimination
in the workplace as well as the courtroom. Although Title VII
and state harassment statutes would also govern employment
settings, it is important that the Bar be able to take measures
against attorneys who demean the profession in this manner.
Therefore, comments should be included with the rule that
explicitly state that the rule governs workplace conduct as well
as courtroom conduct.
B. Operation of the Proposed Rule
Because anti-bias conduct rules have only been in place
since the late 1980s, there is little information concerning vio-
lations to aid in interpreting the operation of such a rule.9 3
However, both state and federal discrimination law should
serve as models for the interpretation and application of the
language of the rule proposed in this Comment.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful
"for an employer to . . .discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. '  Courts have upheld discrim-
inatory work environment claims based on sex,95 race,96 reli-
93. For example, since Rule 8.4(g) of the MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT became effective January 1, 1990, the Minnesota State Bar Association has
received approximately nine or ten complaints involving harassment allegations. Only
one complaint resulted in disciplinary action, and another is pending further
disciplinary proceedings. Letter from William J. Wernz, Director, Minnesota Office of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility, to Leland G. Ripley, Chief Disciplinary Counsel,
Washington State Bar Association (Sept. 13, 1991) (on file with the University of Puget
Sound Law Review).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a)(1) (1982).
95. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
96. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
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gion,9 and national origin.9 8 In Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson," the Supreme Court identified the types of sexual
harassment actionable under Title VII. According to the
Court, actionable harassment can take one of two forms: (1)
quid pro quo,'" or (2) hostile work environment. 10 ' Further,
the Court noted that physical or verbal conduct can constitute
harassment. 0 2 In establishing these two categories, the Court
relied in large part on guidelines established by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the administrative
agency charged with enforcing the provisions of Title VII. 03
Three years later in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins," the
Court ruled that sex stereotyping was a form of unlawful dis-
criminatory conduct under Title VII. In Price Waterhouse, the
Court found that comments made by partners at Price
Waterhouse, a large accounting firm, which suggested that
97. Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
98. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977).
99. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
100. In Meritor, the Supreme Court identifies quid pro quo harassment as
"harassment that involves the conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual
favors." Id. at 62.
101. Hostile work environment harassment is not based on economic benefits, but
instead on a pervasive "hostile or offensive working environment." Id.
102. Id. at 65.
103. The EEOC Guideline governing sexual harassment states as follows:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1990) (footnote omitted).
The EEOC Guideline governing racial or ethnic harassment is similarly worded:
(a) The Commission has consistently held that harassment on the basis of
national origin is a violation of Title VII. An employer has an affirmative
duty to maintain a working environment free of harassment on the basis of
national origin.
(b) Ethnic slurs and other verbal or physical conduct relating to an individ-
ual's national origin constitute harassment when this conduct: (1) Has the
purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working
environment; (2) has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance; or (3) otherwise adversely affects an indi-
vidual's employment opportunities.
Id. § 1606.8 (footnote omitted).
104. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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Hopkins lacked sufficient femininity, 0 5 established a discrimi-
natory animus by sex stereotyping.1' 6
Washington's anti-discrimination statute °7 is significantly
broader in scope than Title VII, governing, inter alia, acts of
discrimination in employment, credit and insurance transac-
tions, HIV infection, or real estate transactions.0' In the intro-
duction to the statute, the legislature declared that acts of
discrimination based on "race, creed, color, national origin, sex,
marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or
physical handicap are a matter of serious state concern,"'" and
that "such discrimination . . . menaces the institutions and
foundation of a free democratic state."" 0
The language of both Title VII and Washington's anti-dis-
crimination statute suggest a goal and purpose similar to the
proposed professional conduct rule: the elimination of discrim-
inatory or harassing behavior in certain particularly sensitive
environments such as the courtroom. Although important dif-
ferences exist between the federal and state statutes and the
proposed conduct rule,"' the application of these statutes can,
nonetheless, assist in interpreting and applying the proposed
rule. Using federal and state statutes as models, the remainder
of this section suggests guidelines for identifying "harassment"
or "invidious discrimination."
The Supreme Court has established four requirements for
a prima facie claim of sexual harassment under Title VII. An
employee must prove that (1) he or she was subjected to
unwelcome sexual conduct, (2) the unwelcome conduct was
based on his or her gender, (3) the unwelcome sexual conduct
was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the terms or condi-
tions of the employee's employment and create an abusive or
hostile work environment, and (4) the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take
105. One partner described [Ms. Hopkins] as "macho"; another suggested that she
"overcompensated for being a woman"; a third advised her to "take a course in charm
school"; and a fourth suggested that Ms. Hopkins would have a better chance at
partnership in the firm if she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id. at
235.
106. Id. at 251.
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010-.330 (1990).
108. Id. § 49.60.010.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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prompt and reasonable remedial action." 2  Element three
defines the threshold of harassment necessary to violate the
statute. Consequently much litigation has centered around this
element.113 Generally, "the more severe the conduct, the less
pervasive it need be. 1" 4
The proposed rule offers similar elements that identify the
threshold necessary to invoke the rule. Because the rule is
written from the perspective of the harasser, instead of the
individual subjected to the proscribed behavior, the elements
are tailored to conform to this perspective. Thus, to be eligible
for sanctions under proposed Rule 8.4(g), an attorney (1) while
acting in a professional capacity, must (2) engage in harassing
or invidiously discriminatory behavior, (3) on the basis of sex,
age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual ori-
entation, or marital status, (4) sufficiently pervasive or severe
to create an abusive or hostile legal environment, or pose a sig-
nificant threat to the fairness of a particular proceeding, or to
the judicial system in its entirety. Structuring the elements of
the rule in this manner allows comparison to Title VII and to
the Washington discrimination statutes,11 5 subject to two
limitations.
The first limitation on the use of state and federal discrim-
ination law for comparison is the limited scope of these stat-
utes. While the proposed rule governs unlawful conduct under
state and federal discrimination statutes, it also applies to cer-
tain conduct that falls outside the scope of these statutes.
Because lawyers perform much of their work in a highly sen-
sitive and volatile environment, the proposed rule of profes-
sional conduct may demand a higher standard of conduct than
do state and federal statutes governing the general public. As
an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to behave in a man-
ner that reflects positively on the judicial system and promotes
fairness in legal proceedings. 1 6
Additionally, certain forms of discrimination, such as dis-
112. Steven H. Winterbauer, Sexual Harassment-The Reasonable Woman
Standard, 7 THE LABOR LAWYER 811, 812 (1991) (citing Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990)). Washington has adopted a
virtually identical test in Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 401, 693 P.2d
708 (1985).
113. Winterbauer, supra note 112, at 812. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
114. Winterbauer, supra note 112, at 812 (citing Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878).
115. See supra notes 106-109 and acccompanying text.
116. See WASHINGTON RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(d) (1991).
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crimination on the basis of sexual preference, are currently
afforded no protection under the law, but would be covered
under the proposed conduct rule. "[I]ntimidation, abuse, har-
assment, or threats that focus on an individual's sexual orienta-
tion"117 have no place in court or in other legal proceedings.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is a substantial
problem in legal proceedings. The American Civil Liberties
Union of New Jersey notes that "the issue of sexual orienta-
tion is more likely to be raised in the context of litigation than
age or marital status as a way of attempting to undermine the
opponent or the opponent's counsel."11 8 In Washington, one
attorney reported an incident in which an expert witness, who
was lesbian, was questioned extensively by the opposing coun-
sel about her sexuality." 9 The expert witness's sexuality had
nothing to do with her expertise, but the opposing counsel was
nonetheless attempting to reduce her credibility with the jury.
Thus, while state and federal statutes do not currently
afford protection based on sexual preference, it is important
that the code of conduct rules recognize this form of discrimi-
nation as offensive and threatening to the equal administration
of justice in order to provide a mechanism to address the
problems previously discussed.
A second but related distinction between proposed Rule
8.4(g) and Title VII is the level of harassment necessary to vio-
late the conduct rule. Because discriminatory or harassing
behavior can jeopardize case outcomes, impair the integrity of
the legal profession, and prevent women and minority lawyers
from effectively carrying out their duties, the threshold neces-
sary to invoke sanctioning under the proposed rule is arguably
lower than the threshold of actionable behavior under state or
federal law. Subtle but intentional tactics that would not rise
to the level of protection under Title VII or Washington dis-
crimination laws can nonetheless cause irreparable harm and
pose a significant threat to the fairness of a particular proceed-
ing, as well as damage the integrity of the legal profession. For
117. Letter from Ruth E. Harlow, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union,
to Florence S. Powers, Legal Research Chief, New Jersey Administrative Office of the
Courts (Apr. 30, 1990) (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
118. New Jersey ACLU Press Release, ACLU Supports Ban on Sexual
Orientation Discrimination in Rule Governing Professional Conduct of Attorneys, at
1 (Apr. 30, 1990) (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
119. Incident reported to the Author by a member of Washington Women
Lawyers.
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example, courts have held that isolated incidences of physically
harassing or abusive behavior will not satisfy the threshold of
conduct necessary for a Title VII claim.' However, in a trial
setting a few well-timed gender- or race-biased comments
intended to prejudice a litigant or witness, or intended to
reduce the credibility of the opposing counsel, can threaten the
fairness of the entire proceeding. Similarly, overly aggressive,
threatening, or abusive behavior toward an opposing counsel,
taking place over a brief period of time, e.g., one trial, can
impair that attorney's ability to effectively perform his or her
duties. Thus, even using Title VII principles, the severity of
the harm dictates a low threshold of actionable conduct.
State and federal laws are also beneficial in developing the
standard of reasonableness to use in evaluating claims of
harassing or discriminating behavior under the proposed rule.
In Title VII cases, the circuits are split over the standard of
reasonableness and the perspective to be used in determining
the severity and persvasiveness of the alleged harm. 2 ' The
majority has "defined harassment from the perspective of the
objective, gender-neutral, reasonable person.' 122
The Ninth Circuit, however, has adopted the opposite
approach. In Ellison v. Brady,1 2 3 the Ninth Circuit held that
the victim's perspective must be used to determine whether
the conduct creates an abusive work environment under Title
VII.124 In Ellison, the perspective was that of a reasonable
woman because the victim was female. Thus, under the Elli-
son rationale, "if a reasonable woman would find the conduct
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions
of [her] employment and create an offensive environment,
then the conduct is sexual harassment.' '1 25
The Washington Supreme Court was among the first state
120. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) ("[Mlere utterance of
an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee would
not affect the conditions of employment to sufficiently significant degree to violate
Title VII.") (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972)); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[A]n isolated epithet by
itself fails to support a cause of action for a hostile environment .... ); Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[S]exually hostile or
intimidating environments are characterized by multiple and varied combinations and
frequencies of offensive exposure .... ).
121. See Winterbauer, supra note 112, at 812-13.
122. Id. at 813; see Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
123. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
124. Id. at 878.
125. See Winterbauer, supra note 111, at 815.
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courts to adopt the reasonable woman standard. In State v.
Wanrow,2 Yvonne Wanrow was charged with murder and
assault after she shot an intruder, whom she believed was
responsible for molesting one of her children, in the home in
which she was staying.' 7 The supreme court adopted a stan-
dard of reasonableness for judging Wanrow's claim of self-
defense that required a jury to consider Wanrow's conduct in
light of the totality of the circumnstances,' s and "in light of her
own perceptions of the situation, including those perceptions
which were the product of our nation's long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination."'129 The court stressed that "until
the effects of [sex discrimination] are eradicated, care must be
taken to ensure that.., self defense instructions afford women
the right to have their conduct judge[d] in light of the ...
handicaps that are the product of sex discrimination."'3 °
Finally, the court concluded that the failure to consider the
woman's perspective is to deny women the right to trial "by
the same rules which are applicable to male defendants."''
The Washington Supreme Court's rationale in Wanrow
can logically be extended to the application of anti-harassment
and anti-discrimination professional conduct rules. The Task
Force reports note that a higher percentage of women and
minority attorneys perceive the existence of bias in the Wash-
ington legal system, 3 2 and further perceive a greater detri-
mental impact on the system. 33 To determine whether an
attorney's conduct is sanctionable under proposed Rule 8.4(g),
the standard of reasonableness should be from the perspective
126. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
127. 1& at 226, 559 P.2d at 551.
128. Wanrow was five foot four inches tall and had a cast on her leg. Id The
night of the shooting the decedent entered the home in which Wanrow was staying,
and when asked to leave he declined to do so. I& He was a large man, over six feet
tall, and visibly drunk when he entered the home. Id Wanrow's seven-year-old
daughter had previously identified the decedent as the man who molested her. Id at
224, 559 P.2d at 550. He first approached one of the children in the room and then
approached Wanrow. Id. at 226, 559 P.2d at 551. Wanrow, startled by the situation,
shot the decedent. I&.
129. I& at 240, 559 P.2d. at 559 (citation omitted).
130. Id
131. Id at 240-41, 559 P.2d at 559.
132. GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 112 (a higher percentage of
women respondents than men noted gender biased behavior); MINORITY AND JUSTICE
REPORT, supra note 3, at xxi ("Minorities believe that bias pervades the entire legal
system in general and hence, they do not trust the court system to resolve their
disputes or administer justice evenhandedly.").
133. GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 112.
[Vol. 16:741
Bias in Washington Courts
of the reasonable "victim" of harassing or discriminatory
behavior. Adopting a standard that includes both objective and
subjective factors would allow the rule to protect women and
minority participants in the legal system from a divergence in
opinion as to what constitutes in appropriate conduct, but
would not overburden the system with complaints by oversen-
sitive participants. By adopting a standard that considers the
perspective of the victimized individual(s), the rule serves to
sensitize all attorneys to the effects of harassing and discrimi-
natory behavior.
In sum, as the Washington State Legislature declared,"acts of discrimination are matters of serious state concern." 1 4
The rule proposed in this section (1) provides a clear message
that harassing and discriminatory behavior will not be toler-
ated in Washington legal proceedings, (2) effectively targets
the kind of behavior that is most detrimental to the legal sys-
tem, (3) reasonably limits the scope of the rule to professional
behavior that has a direct effect on the system, and (4) pro-
vides a concrete rule that the Washington State Bar can use to
discipline attorneys.
IV. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT PASSES CONSTITUTIONAL
SCRUTINY
Opponents of the rule proposed in this Comment, and of
similar rules proposed or in place in other states, argue that
because these rules regulate verbal conduct, such rules imper-
missibly restrain an attorney's right to free speech under the
First Amendment. 13' This section critically examines this
argument with respect to the rule proposed in this Comment.
Part A identifies the constitutional obstacles to the regulation
of speech and identifies the various tests applied by the
Supreme Court when scrutinizing government action regulat-
ing speech, it then applies these tests to the proposed rule and
concludes that the proposed rule falls within the scope of per-
134. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (1990).
135. E.g., "[T]he proposed rule is so broad and vague as to chill a lawyer's
professional, personal, and First Amendment activities." Letter from Judith E.
Bendich to Dennis Harwick, Executive Director for the Board of Governors,
Washington State Bar Association (Aug. 20, 1991) (on file with the University of Puget
Sound Law Review); "[S]ections [of the proposed rule] clearly violate First
Amendment rights .... ." Letter from Fred M. Zeder to Washington State Bar
Association Board of Governors (Aug. 20, 1991) (on file with the University of Puget
Sound Law Review).
1993]
768 University of Puget Sound Law Review
missible regulation. In support of this conclusion, Part B fur-
ther explores the analogy between the protections afforded
under the proposed rule and under Title VII and Washington
discrimination laws.
A. First Amendment Doctrine
The Supreme Court has never held that the First Amend-
ment protects all speech. The Court has removed from protec-
tion categories of speech that are considered to be of such
slight social value that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by their costs to order and moral-
ity.136 These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words." 7
Where the Court determines that the regulated speech
does not fall into the category of "low value," and thus unpro-
tected speech, it generally affords that speech First Amend-
ment protection, unless it finds a compelling governmental
interest, unrelated to the suppression of the speech, that out-
weighs the value of the protected speech.
Where the regulation of the speech is directed at the con-
tent of the speech, the inquiry is particularly rigorous.
Supreme Court analysis of such content-based regulations,
however, has been far from clear. At times the Court has held
that content-based regulations must be rejected unless they
fall into the narrow class of unprotected speech mentioned
above.' 3 However, the Court has developed other lines of
analysis for content-based restrictions, in which governmental
interests are balanced against individual interests.139
136. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
137. Id. at 571-72.
138. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
139. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640
(1981) (soliciting); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (loud noises); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (leafletting).
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986), the Court
blurred the line between content-neutral and content-based restrictions and upheld a
ban on adult theaters within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-
family dwelling, church, park, or school. Id, at 54. The Court found that although the
ordinance in question did, in fact, regulate films on the basis of their content, the
predominate concern of the City was the effect of adult theaters on the surrounding
community and not with the content of the adult films themselves. Id. at 47. The
Court upheld the city ordinance because the ordinance served a substantial
governmental interest, which was unrelated to the suppression of speech, and which
allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of communication. Id. at 52.
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In United States v. O'Brien, 40 the Court established a
three-part test that has often been employed to determine
whether a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified.
Under the O'Brien test, a governmental regulation is justified
only when it satisfies the following elements: (1) the govern-
mental regulation must further an important or substantial
governmental interest, (2) the governmental interest must be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (3) the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.' 41
Applying the three-part O'Brien test, the proposed rule
falls within the zone of substantial governmental interests per-
missibly protectable under the First Amendment. First, the
proposed rule clearly furthers a substantial state interest: the
fair and effective administration of justice. The Gender and
Justice and Minority and Justice Task Force reports amply
demonstrate that discrimination exists in the Washington judi-
cial system, that stereotyping and bias impair the credibility
and efficacy of law, and that discrimination impedes the effec-
tive administration of justice. The proposed rule is designed to
combat these effects.
Commentators who resist even the most minor govern-
ment restraints on speech argue that any regulation of speech
thwarts the truth-seeking process and inhibits the sharing of
knowledge. 142 Toleration of distasteful speech, these commen-
tators argue, is the price to be paid for individual liberty.143 In
the judicial process, however, the regulation of certain speech
furthers the truth-seeking process, whereas unregulated
speech and behavior has a stifling effect on the delivery of jus-
tice. Because discriminatory behavior throws individual rights
into jeopardy, the court has a duty to eliminate these tactics.
Failure to adopt such a rule is tantamount to official condona-
tion of discriminatory behavior. Furthermore, in addition to
curbing actual discriminatory behavior, rules such as the pro-
posed rule have symbolic, practical, and educational value as a
public statement supporting the rights and equal dignity of all
persons.
140. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
141. Id. at 377.
142. Ronald J. Riccio, Free Speech v. Freedom From Bigotry: A Look at
University Codes, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 1.
143. Id.
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Furthermore, the proposed rule is sufficiently narrow in
scope so as to infringe on allegedly protected speech no more
than is permissibly necessary to further the goals of the rule.
Unlike the Michigan proposal, the proposed Washington rule
limits the scope of its application to behavior in connection
with an attorney's professional activities and, furthermore,
limits prohibited conduct to behavior that is intentionally
discriminatory.
Two additional lines of analysis further support the consti-
tutionality of the proposed rule: forum-based analysis and pub-
lic trust analysis. The Court has, on occasion, applied a forum-
based analysis to determine whether the forum is one gener-
ally dedicated to the free exchange of ideas, or whether the
forum is a place where individuals can reasonably expect to be
insulated from certain speech, or to have their own speech con-
strained. Forum-based analysis reflects an understanding that"paternalism is not considered a legitimate justification for
restricting free speech,""' but that under certain circum-
stances victims of oppressive speech may not be free to ignore
or to counter such speech. A forum-based analysis upholds
First Amendment protection in settings that promote or sup-
port counter-speech, and it rejects First Amendment protec-
tion where effective counter-speech is suppressed.
Using the forum-based analysis, the Supreme Court has
upheld forum-based restrictions in schools,145 the military,14
and the home.147
In F.C.C v. Pacifica Foundation,'" the Court affirmed the
Federal Communication Commission's sanctioning of a radio
broadcast that the Commission found obscene. In upholding
the sanction, the Court applied a forum-based analysis, noting
the "uniquely pervasive presence" that broadcast media has
144. Wendy J. Thurm, Recent Developments, The First Amendmen4 Attorney
Discipline and Public Accountability-Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida and the
Florida Bar, 734 F. Supp. 981 (S.D. Fla. 1990), 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 240, 251
(1991).
145. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (censorship of
school newspaper); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
(censorship of student use of sexual innuendo); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
(speech rights abridged where speech disrupted an educational setting).
146. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (military base not a place
traditionally dedicated to free speech).
147. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (limiting broadcast of obscene words to
captive audience); Rowan v. United States P.O., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (control over
unwanted mail allowed because of sanctity of the home).
148. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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established in our lives, and that the nature of broadcast media
is such that listeners cannot adequately protect themselves
from unexpected program content.149 Thus, because broadcast
media directs speech at a captive audience, the Court found
that an individual's right to be free from obscene radio broad-
casting outweighed the First Amendment rights of Pacifica to
freely broadcast the material.-'
Applying a forum-based analysis to the proposed rule, it is
clear that courtroom and employment settings have never been
viewed as places devoted to unfettered expression. In fact, lim-
itations on speech abound in both these settings. Rules of pro-
fessional conduct, as well as state and federal rules of evidence,
significantly constrain what can and cannot be said both inside
and outside the courtroom. Just as the rule of relevance151
prohibits testimony that is not germane to the case, and the
hearsay rule" 2 prohibits evidence that is not trustworthy, pro-
posed Rule 8.4(g) eliminates communication or commentary
that detracts from the merits of a case and is in fact detrimen-
tal to the truth-seeking process. Just as the broadcast media
required special treatment under the First Amendment, legal
proceedings similarly create a captive audience, and thus
require special treatment as well.
In certain captive settings, such as the courtroom, victims
of discriminatory behavior are not free to respond. For a vari-
ety of reasons, these victims are compelled to remain silent.
Legal settings, particularly the courtroom, further constrain
one's ability to defend oneself against harassment and discrimi-
natory behavior. Usually many interests are at stake, typically
the clients'. Attorneys, litigants, and witnesses who are sub-
jected to discriminatory tactics or behavior are often unable to
negate the effect of such behavior on a jury. 15
149. Id. at 748.
150. Id. at 748-49.
151. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that "[e]vidence which is not relevant
is not admissible." FED. R. EvID. 402 (1991).
152. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that "[hiearsay is not admissible
except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. EVID. 802 (1991).
153. An excerpt from the GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT describes a trial in which
a woman attorney was forced to turn over much of her case to her co-counsel because
the judge refused to entertain any objections or arguments from the woman attorney.
Given the judge's attitude, the woman attorney had no choice and it was the only way
the client could be well represented. GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at
116.
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Title VII regulations similarly reflect this concern.
Employees are protected from discriminatory behavior because
under the controlled environment of the work place, the detri-
mental effect of such behavior is significant and because indi-
viduals' abilities to defend themselves against harassment and
discriminatory behavior is often constrained.
Often a rationale for rejecting paternalism as a justifica-
tion for the regulation of speech is that the state has no duty to
protect individuals from discriminatory words-recipients of
such commentary are overly sensitive."M In a legal setting,
however, discriminatory conduct has an impact on all who wit-
ness it, including jurors who may ultimately base their opin-
ions on the credibility of the litigants and witnesses. Thus, the
state has a duty to proscribe any conduct that has the effect of
unfairly undermining the credibility of litigants or witnesses,
or detracting from the merits of a particular case. The effect
of discriminatory tactics goes far beyond the sensitivities of
those who are the object of such behavior. Furthermore, there
is a public expectation that legal settings, both public and pri-
vate, should be unbiased and neutral toward the participants.
The state has a compelling interest in providing an environ-
ment where all participants in the judicial process can proceed
free of the baggage associated with discriminatory behavior.
Similarly, the government's interest in "promot[ing] effi-
ciency and integrity in the discharge of its official duties,"15 is
the cornerstone of public trust analysis of speech regulations.
Under a public trust analysis, the Court has held that those
charged with the public trust can be asked to limit expression
that undermines their ability to do their jobs. Using the public
trust analysis, the Supreme Court has justified speech regula-
tions in school,"' work place settings, 5 7 and even the judicial
system.158
154. See Riccio, supra note 142, at 1.
155. Id.
156. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (censorship of
school newspaper); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
(censorship of student use of sexual innuendo); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
(speech rights abridged where it disrupted an educational setting).
157. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (those
charged with public trust can be asked to limit expression that undermines their
ability to do their jobs); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)(same).
158. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (attorney discipline
for expression of particular views held constitutional because it bore a rational
connection to attorney's fitness to practice law).
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Connick v. Myers' 9 illustrates public trust analysis
employed by the Court when the suppression of speech
involves those charged with the public trust. In Connick, the
respondent, a former Assistant District Attorney in Louisiana,
alleged that she had been wrongfully terminated for exercising
her right to free speech, because she prepared an office ques-
tionnaire "concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the
need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in
supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in
political campaigns."'"
The Court, upholding the termination, employed a balanc-
ing test "between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen,
... and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees."'' The balancing test, identified by the Court in
Connick, "requires full consideration of the government's
interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsi-
bilities to the public."' 62 The Court explained: "To this end,
the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion
and control over the management of its personnel and internal
affairs.' 163
A primary function of the judicial system is to deliver fair,
equal, and effective justice. This goal is undermined by dis-
criminatory behavior. To promote fair and effective justice,
the state must have wide latitude in fashioning rules to elimi-
nate discriminatory behavior. Although public trust analysis is
generally applied to public employees, its principles can be
applied to rules of professional conduct governing both public
and private attorneys. All attorneys are officers of the court
and thus represent state interests in the judicial system.
Three recent decisions involving attorney disciplinary pro-
ceedings further illustrate the substantial weight accorded the
state's interest in the fairness of a particular proceeding and
the public confidence in the judicial system. The rulings, from
the United States Supreme Court and the highest courts of
New York and Missouri, uphold a state's right to limit attorney
speech or conduct when that conduct threatens to prejudice a
159. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
160. Id. at 141.
161. I& at 142.
162. 1d at 150.
163. Id. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
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particular proceeding or to "bring the Bench and Bar into
disrepute."'' 4
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,165 the majority con-
cluded that state bar associations' professional conduct rules
may prohibit extra-judicial statements by trial lawyers that
pose a "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" to a
trial.' 6 The Court held that the First Amendment rights of
attorneys are limited by the power of the courts to regulate
attorney conduct to ensure a fair trial.6 7
In In re Westfall,168 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a
reprimand in an attorney discipline proceeding issued to a
prosecuting attorney who called a judge's ruling "illogical" and"a little bit less than honest."' 69 Among other infractions, the
court upheld a finding that Westfall had violated Rule 8.4(d),
which prohibits conduct that is "prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice."'70 At his trial, Westfall asserted that, as
applied, Rule 8.4 violated his First Amendment right to free
speech and his listeners' right to know.' 7' In upholding
Westfall's reprimand and rejecting his First Amendment argu-
ments, the court noted that "[1]awyers are an integral part of
and integral to the administration of justice .... [L]awyers do
not stand in the shoes of ordinary citizens."'1 72 As such, the
court found a sufficient state interest in the regulation of attor-
ney speech and conduct to uphold the reprimand.
Finally, in In re Holtzman,'73 New York's highest court
upheld a letter of reprimand issued under New York's Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 8-102 and 1-102(A)(6). Section
1-102(A)(6) provided that "a lawyer shall not [e]ngage in any
conduct that adversely reflects on [the lawyer's] fitness to prac-
164. In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991).
165. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
166. Id. at 2725.
167. Id. at 2722. A different majority ultimately found that Nevada's application
of the material prejudice rule was unconstitutionally vague, not for its restrictions on
speech, but because Nevada included a safe harbor provision that permitted a lawyer
to make statements "without elaboration" of the general nature of the claim or
defense." Id. at 2731. The Court reasoned that "general" and "elaboration" are
"classic terms of degree" that provide no real guidance to the lawyer wishing to make
a public statement. I&
168. 808 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. 1991).
169. Id at 831.
170. Id at 839.
171. Id at 833.
172. Id at 836.
173. 577 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1991).
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tice law."' 7 4 The court ruled that the language of the rule was
not impermissibly vague and explained that "the guiding prin-
ciple must be whether a reasonable attorney . . . would have
notice of what conduct is proscribed.' 7 5 As examples of pro-
hibited conduct, the New York court pointed to acts that"serve to bring the Bench and Bar in disrepute,' ' 76 and acts
that "tend to undermine the public confidence in the judicial
system."'177
In sum, Gentile, Westfall, and Holtzman demonstrate that
"[b]road standards governing professional conduct are permis-
sible" and wise.'78  The proposed rule falls well within the
bounds of permissible state regulation and furthers a substan-
tial state interest: the fair and effective administration of
justice.
B. Title VII Analogy
The Title VII and Washington anti-discrimination analo-
gies to the proposed rule, used in Section III to explain the pro-
posed rule's scope and application, further serve as models to
support the constitutionality of the proposed rule. Although
both Title VII and Washington's anti-discrimination statute
potentially intrude on harassers' free speech rights, these stat-
utes are not typically viewed as mandated restrictions on free
speech. 179 No Title VII claim has been defended on First
Amendment grounds.' Thus, "Title VII may be seen both as
evidence that intrusions on such speech are not unprecedented
and as a viable ideological model for the"'' regulation of dis-
criminatory or harassing behavior in judicial system. 8 2 This
section explores three similarities between the workplace and
the judicial system that justify affording the same protected
status to participants in legal proceedings that is currently
afforded to employees.
First, Title VII elevated the workplace to protected status
when harassment interferes with work performance, because
174. Id at 31. This disciplinary provision is now DR 1-102(A)(7).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 31 (N.Y. 1991).
179. See Lange, supra note 6, at 120.
180. Id at 121 n.93.
181. Id at 120.
182. Much of the methodology used in this section parallels the approach taken by
Ellen E. Lange, supra note 6.
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Congress found that the quality of an individual's employment
represents a substantial governmental interest worthy of pro-
tection.'83 Arguably the importance of fair and impartial legal
proceedings warrants a similarly protected status.
Second, Title VII protects the work environment because
this environment is such that escape from harassing or dis-
criminatory behavior is difficult and the consequences are
often severe. The loss of income, self-esteem, success, and the
difficulty in relocating that may ensue when an individual
attempts to escape racial or sexual harassment in the work-
place are often prohibitive and may force an individual to
remain in the oppressive environment. Victims of harassing or
discriminatory behavior in the legal system face similar con-
straints. Attorneys, litigants, and witnesses who are subjected
to discriminatory trial tactics or behavior are often unable to
respond or negate the effect of such behavior on a jury.
Finally, Title VII regulates behavior in discrete and defina-
ble environments. "The boundaries of the workplace are iden-
tifiable . . . [e.g.,] a job description, an office building, or a
specific relationship."'" Similarly, the proposed rule would
regulate behavior within limited and definable boundaries, e.g.,
courtrooms, judges' chambers, law offices, bar activities, and
other professional meetings. Because the proposed rule is lim-
ited in scope to conduct in connection with a lawyer's profes-
sional activities, the "risk of overintrusiveness is limited by the
nature of the setting."' 5 The rule thus balances the state's
interest in regulating the profession against an individual
attorney's First Amendment free association and speech rights.
Just as employers and employees under Title VII are free from
its regulation once outside the work place, attorneys remain
free to participate in organizations or activities that promote
ideologies inconsistent with the rule so long as those activities
remain unconnected to their participation in the judicial
system.
V. CONCLUSION
Logically, what Title VII has achieved in the workplace
should also be achieved in the legal environment. 8 ' The value
183. See Lange, supra note 6, at 127-28.
184. Id. at 127.
185. Id
186. Id.
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and necessity of fair legal proceedings warrant giving the
courtroom the same protected status as the workplace. The
protective rights accorded the individuals in the workplace-
protection from harassment and discrimination-ought to be
accorded to participants in the legal system.18 7
The persvasiveness and severity of harm due to harassing
and discriminatory tactics by attorneys are amply documented
and illustrate the need for corrective measures. The Task
Force findings further demonstrate the inability of the current
Washington Rules of Professional Conduct to adequately
address these tactics. Some judges continue to permit openly
sexist, racist, and derogatory conduct in the courtroom,1ss and
many attorneys view sexual and racial trial tactics as legiti-
mate forms of advocacy. Although the anecdotal evidence of
such behavior exists, attorneys are rarely disciplined for such
offensive conduct because the current rules do not set a clear
standard of minimally acceptable conduct with respect to the
treatment of other attorneys or participants in the judicial
system.
A mandatory professional conduct rule specifically forbid-
ding harassing or discriminatory behavior would further four
important functions. 89 First, such a provision would demon-
strate that the Washington Supreme Court and the Washing-
ton State Bar Association are committed to eliminating the
effects of bias on the state judiciary. Lawyers wield tremen-
dous power in our society. Attorney behavior can set or mod-
ify societal norms. 19° Thus, "mobilizing lawyers... to combat
187. Id
188. According to Gender and Justice Task Force survey respondents, "judges,
counsel, or others intervene only in a minority of cases where gender-biased behavior
occurs." GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 132. One respondent writes,
"The judge was very condescending to a young female witness of mine. His attitude
was blatant and offensive." Id. at 131. Not all judges, however, permit or participate in
such conduct. Another survey respondent noted that "[a] witness and examining
counsel repeatedly referred to a mature woman as 'girl' and finally 'the honey'. The
judge instructed both male participants to use appropriate, respectful language when
discussing the woman." Id. at 133.
189. See Koustenis, supra note 19, at 167 (supporting mandatory conduct rules
barring discriminatory trial tactics).
190. In an editorial supporting the adoption of the proposed conduct rules for
attorneys and judges in Michigan, attorney Victoria Roberts describes the actions
taken by the Associated Press Sports Editors to combat discriminatory membership
policies at golf clubs as an example of the power of a group to attack invidious
discrimination through cohesive group action. Roberts explains:
[The Associated Press Sports Editors] urged the Professional Golf Association
(PGA) to take a leadership role in eliminating discriminatory membership
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invidious discrimination could have a tremendous impact."' 91
Second, the rule would have an enormous educative value,
both inside and outside the legal profession. While some attor-
neys intentionally engage in conduct designed to reinforce ste-
reotypes to play to particular biases, others are simply unaware
of the effect such behavior has on all who are exposed to the
conduct. The significantly larger percentage of women and
minority survey respondents who reported that they perceived
bias in the Washington courts suggest that some attorneys are
not aware of the impact of conduct that reinforces stereotypes
or perpetuates bias. The proposed conduct rule would call
attention to the effects of such behavior and force attorneys to
think about what conduct is appropriate and reasonable in a
legal setting.
Because non-attorneys are exposed to and are affected by
attorney conduct, others participating in legal proceedings
would also be influenced by such a rule. If non-attorney par-
ticipants see lawyers and judges treating women and minorities
with respect and dignity, they are more likely to also engage in
the same behavior and to question the appropriateness of any
other type of treatment. Women and minority attorneys who
would no longer be forced to defend their gender or their race
could more easily become societal role models and more effec-
tive advocates for their clients.
Additionally, "a mandatory provision would make it much
easier to address the subject in law school legal ethics
courses."'192 The Gender and Justice Report calls for the devel-
opment of "required curriculum instruction on the existence of
and effects of gender [and race bias] in the courts and in the
policies throughout the country by making open membership policies a
prerequisite for hosting a championship. This action followed a statement by
the founder of the all-white Shoal Creek Golf Club in Alabama, the site of the
PGA Open in August [1990], that he would not be pressured into accepting
blacks.
Faced with a media and advertising boycott of the PGA, the Shoal Creek
founder was, in fact, pressured into accepting a black member. More
significantly, the PGA revamped its golf course selection criteria to give the
same weight to membership policies that it accords to such factors as the
quality of the golf course and the course's ability to handle spectators and
accommodate an event of the magnitude of the PGA.
Victoria A. Roberts, Can Rules Eliminate "Invidious Discrimination?," MICH. BAR J.,
Dec. 1990, at 1284.
191. Id.
192. Koustenis, supra note 19, at 167.
[Vol. 16:741
Bias in Washington Courts
profession."' 93 Students exposed to the proposed conduct rule
would enter the profession aware of the problem of bias in the
Washington courts and aware of what behavior is expected of
them.
Third, the proposed rule gives the Washington State Bar
Association the tool it needs to combat invidious discrimina-
tion. Because of the destructive effect that discrimination has
on the integrity of the judicial system, the Bar's disciplinary
procedures are the appropriate mechanism to address and
eliminate the discriminatory behavior of lawyers as lawyers.
Furthermore, "such a provision would assist [victims of harass-
ing or discriminatory behavior] who wish to file complaints.""'
Finally, for all the reasons mentioned above, adopting such
a rule makes progress toward the eradication of bias instead of
merely accepting the status quo.
In sum, the Washington Supreme Court should join the
courts of Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
and Vermont, and "commit itself unambiguously to the elimi-
nation of all manifestations"'95 of harassing and invidiously
discriminatory behavior by attorneys. The Washington
Supreme Court should adopt proposed Rule 8.4(g).
"Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."
-Martin Luther King
193. GENDER AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 138.
194. Koustenis, supra note 19, at 167.
195. James A. Robertson, Discrimination and the Legal System, MICH. BAR J.,
Dec. 1990, at 1254.
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